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Gene drive is a naturally occurring phenomenon in which selfish genetic
elements manipulate gametogenesis and reproduction to increase their
own transmission to the next generation. Currently, there is great excitement
about the potential of harnessing such systems to control major pest and
vector populations. If synthetic gene drive systems can be constructed and
applied to key species, they may be able to rapidly spread either modifying
or eliminating the targeted populations. This approach has been lauded as a
revolutionary and efficient mechanism to control insect-borne diseases and
crop pests. Driving endosymbionts have already been deployed to combat
the transmission of dengue and Zika virus in mosquitoes. However, there
are a variety of barriers to successfully implementing gene drive techniques
in wild populations. There is a risk that targeted organisms will rapidly
evolve an ability to suppress the synthetic drive system, rendering it ineffec-
tive. There are also potential risks of synthetic gene drivers invading non-
target species or populations. This Special Feature covers the current state
of affairs regarding both natural and synthetic gene drive systems with
the aim to identify knowledge gaps. By understanding how natural drive
systems spread through populations, we may be able to better predict the
outcomes of synthetic drive release.
1. Introduction
All organisms harbour a variety of genes that violate the assumption of equal
transmission, instead selfishly increasing their frequency in subsequent gener-
ations (called drive) at a cost to the genome as a whole. Such selfish genes
can make up a substantial proportion of the genome and show a range of strat-
egies to enhance their spread [1]. Some gene drives are transmission distorters
that target gametogenesis to ensure they are over-represented in eggs or sperm
following meiosis, resulting in effective transmission distortion. Such meiotic
drivers were first described almost a century ago and have been characterized
in plants, insects and mammals [1]. They may be autosomal (e.g. t haplotype in
house mice Mus musculus, which is transmitted from males to up to 100% of
offspring—[2]) or linked to one of the sex chromosomes resulting in sex ratio
distortion (e.g. SR in flies, causing up to 100% daughters [3]). Synthetic gene
drives have recently been developed that produce similar results—transmitting
themselves to nearly all offspring. If synthetic gene drive systems can be con-
structed and inserted into pest populations, they may be able to rapidly
spread, potentially disrupting the function of a vital gene leading to population
extinction [4,5] or converting the entire population to males [6]. Alternatively,
the gene drive could carry with it a package of genes, aimed at permanently
modifying the target population. Possible modifications include making mos-
quitoes incapable of transmitting malaria [7] or increasing their vulnerability
to pesticides.
The potential of harnessing gene drive systems in the control of major pests
has been received with both enthusiasm and scepticism. This approach has
been lauded as a revolutionary and efficient mechanism to control insect-
borne diseases and crop pests, being highly targeted and potentially vastly
cheaper than conventional methods such as pesticides [8]. However, there are
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a variety of barriers, both technical and ethical, to implement
this technique in wild populations. We urgently need to
understand how natural drive systems spread through popu-
lations if we are to predict the outcomes of synthetic drive
release. One key barrier is the risk that target populations
will rapidly evolve an ability to suppress the drive system,
rendering it ineffective, as has been seen in natural drive sys-
tems [9]. So, how much do we currently know about the
dynamics of gene drivers?
2. Scope of the Special Issue
This Special Feature issue comprises 14 contributions, cover-
ing a wide range of aspects of natural and synthetic gene
drivers in a range of animal and plant species. We introduce
and discuss these below grouped into three broad topics:
(i) synthetic drive systems, (ii) natural drive systems, and
(iii) implementation success and wider ethical considerations
of gene drives.
(a) Synthetic drive systems
The Special Feature starts with two reviews. The first, Ritchie &
Staunton [10], reflects on the lessons to be learnt from 20 years
of involvement in the most advanced programme of gene drive
intervention: the use of the endosymbiont Wolbachia to sup-
press virus transmission by mosquitoes. They discuss the
history of mosquito control, from pesticides, through natural
enemies and sterile male releases, and the limitations of these
approaches that have led to the urgent need for more effective
solutions. They then discuss the discovery of a strain of
the intracellular parasite Wolbachia, which when inserted
into Aedes aegypti mosquitoes reduces dengue transmission to
humans. This strain of Wolbachia spreads through mosquito
populations by cytoplasmic incompatibility: eggs of uninfected
females cannot be fertilized in matings with males infected
with Wolbachia, but eggs of infected females can be fertilized
by infected and uninfected males, giving infected females a fit-
ness advantage. Since the release of these mosquitoes in
Cairns, Australia, the city has been dengue free, making this
the most successful gene drive intervention to date.
The second review, by Barrett et al. [11], focuses on gene
drive in plants; an area where relatively little gene drive
work has been carried out. They summarize many of the
key opportunities and questions, and discuss strategies to
use synthetic gene drive to improve the control of weeds.
One key approach is direct population suppression by killing
target plant species. However, they suggest that a more useful
approach may be modification, making weed species more
vulnerable to traditional control techniques such as pesti-
cides. For agricultural uses, this has enormous potential, as
it limits the killing effect of the driver to populations targeted
by pesticides, radically reducing any impact of the driver on
non-target populations. Another interesting use is to enhance
the survival of endangered plant species by driving specific
useful genes, such as drought tolerance, into vulnerable
populations. In particular, the review highlights the issue of
seed-banking, the long-term persistence of seeds in the soil.
Barrett et al. [11] show that the seed bank can slow the
spread of gene drive by acting as a reservoir of wild-type
seeds. This issue is largely unique to plants, although it
could perhaps be applicable to animals with cryptobiotic
phases, such as tardigrades, nematodes and rotifers.
Beaghton et al. [12] focus on gene conversion drive, which
has become relatively easy to construct because of the advent
of CRISPR/Cas9. This type of drive uses a synthetic nuclease
driver that copies itself onto homologous chromosomes,
allowing it to rapidly spread through populations. If the
drive disrupts a key gene related to fertility, its spread
could radically reduce the productivity of the population.
This paper focuses on the issue of non-functional resistance
at target genes. Modelling and practical experiments (e.g.
Oberhofer et al. [13]) have found that the targeted gene can
rapidly evolve to be unrecognizable to the driver, preventing
gene conversion and allowing this resistant allele to maintain
functional versions of the targeted gene in the population.
However, an unappreciated issue is that mutations can also
create unrecognizable target alleles without maintaining
function in the target gene. Previously, this possibility has
been largely overlooked, as non-functional resistant alleles
still lead to the genes in the population becoming increas-
ingly damaged. However, here Beaghton et al. [12] point
out that there is typically a cost to the drive mechanism.
Non-functional resistant alleles do not bear the cost of drive
and are immune to gene conversion, so can potentially
spread through populations containing drive, reducing the
spread of the driver. This is a great illustration of how impor-
tant it is for modelling and empirical work to closely inform
each other during the design and use of a synthetic drive.
The next paper, by Holman [14], also models an interest-
ing but unexplored area of gene drive, the potential use of
synthetic meiotic drivers in species with ZW sex determi-
nation systems. In ZW organisms like butterflies and birds,
females have the heterozygous sex chromosomes. The
model suggests that W-shredding Z chromosome drivers,
whose female carriers only produce sons, should spread extre-
mely rapidly if the evolution of resistance can be avoided.
This model is a major step forward in the development of
gene drives for unexplored ZW pest species, including the tre-
matodes that cause schistosomiasis, and serious Lepidopteran
agricultural pests.
There is also real interest in using synthetic gene drive as
a conservation measure to control invasive species such as
rats and mice that have caused serious decline to many vul-
nerable endemic bird, mammal and lizard populations.
Godwin et al. [15] review the possibilities of using gene
drives to control pest populations of rodents. They consider
proposed CRISPR-based homology-directed repair drive sys-
tems (which have not yet been made to work robustly in mice
[16]) and also the modification of a widespread ancient house
mouse drive system, the t haplotype, into a sex ratio driver.
An advantage of co-opting an ancient drive system, in
which suppressors have not been found, is that rapid evol-
ution of resistance may be less of a problem. Manser et al.
[17] further explore this t haplotype-based synthetic driver,
which is in development. The t haplotype is an autosomal
sperm-killing driver that manipulates sperm, so that nearly
all offspring from a heterozygous male inherit the t haplo-
type. The t-Sry project aims to take the key mammalian sex
determination gene Sry from the mouse Y chromosome and
insert it onto the t haplotype on chromosome 17, thus creat-
ing ‘t-Sry’, an autosomal gene drive that turns all
individuals that inherit it into a male. The idea is to introduce
t-Sry to island mouse pest populations, thereby turning the
entire population male and eliminating it altogether [18,19].
Manser et al. [17] explore the population dynamics of the
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t-Sry system. They model introductions of t-Sry to islands
where female mice have varying rates of polyandry (multiple
mating). As the t haplotype damages sperm, bearers have
poor success when the females they mate with also mate
with wild-type males with undamaged sperm. Manser’s
models [17] suggest that populations with high rates of poly-
andry will make it more difficult for t-Sry to spread, requiring
higher release effort. As polyandry is widespread in nature
[20], these results may be also relevant for other drive systems
that reduce male sperm competitiveness.
Godwin et al. [15] further highlight some key biological,
regulatory and safety challenges for using gene drives in
mice. The biology, ecology and behaviour of target island
rodent populations remain poorly understood. At least as
important, they follow Ritchie & Staunton [10] and George
et al. [21] in emphasizing how crucial it will be for regulatory
frameworks to keep up with the pace of gene drive research,
and how vital it is to ensure that the communities and stake-
holders affected are consulted, informed and given a major
role in any decisions about the deployment of drives.
(b) Natural drive systems
Understanding how synthetic drive systems are likely to
spread in nature, before any releases, is critical to the assess-
ment of risks and benefits of synthetic drivers. Fortunately,
the study of natural drive systems over the last century has
provided considerable theoretical and empirical insights into
how drivers work and how they spread. Until recently, we
have been lacking sufficient data on fitness costs of natural dri-
vers to make models about their spread in nature that match
well to driver frequencies observed in wild populations.
In this Special Feature, four studies report on fitness costs
associated with male meiotic drivers. These drivers act
during sperm development to eliminate their competition,
namely, non-driver carrying sperm, which promotes their
own transmission. Finnegan et al. [22], Larner et al. [23],
Dyer & Hall [24] and Lea & Unckless [25] measured fitness
costs in males and females associated with their species-
specific meiotic driver, in stalk-eyed flies Teleopsis dalmanni,
in the fruit fly Drosophila pseudoobscura, in Drosophila recens
and in Drosophila melanogaster, Drosophila affinis and Drosophila
neotestacea, respectively. These fitness costs are apparent as
reduced egg-to-adult viability [22], reduced offspring pro-
duction in females [23,24] and reduced sperm competition
success [24]. Fitness costs are, however, trait-specific. Lea &
Unckless [25] found no reduced immune function associated
with male meiotic drive, and Dyer & Hall [24] found no effects
on female mating preferences or on longevity. Larner et al. [23]
and Dyer & Hall [24] then used the quantified fitness costs to
parametrize population genetic models to predict equilibrium
frequencies in nature. These predicted frequencies came close
to observed frequencies. This is an important step in under-
standing the dynamics of natural drive systems, and while
the details will vary between systems, collectively these studies
broaden the appreciation of potential fitness costs in nature.
The drive systems investigated in these four studies lie
within large chromosomal rearrangements that prevent recom-
bination from breaking up critical drive elements [22,25].
It remains unknown to what extent these fitness costs
arise solely as a consequence of reduced recombination,
which allows the accumulation of harmful mutations or are
pleiotropic effects of the drivers themselves.
Fitness costs also select for the evolution of genetic sup-
pressors of the drive. Suppressors are present in most
Drosophila drive systems [26], yet not in D. pseudoobscura.
Price et al. [27] consider why this might be. The low, stable
drive frequencies observed in the wild can be explained by
fitness costs arising from the combined effect of poor sperm
competitive ability of SR males and costs to homozygous
SR females. However, these fitness costs affecting driver
dynamics still imply that the evolution of suppression of
drive would be advantageous. The absence of suppressors
is therefore puzzling. This Drosophila drive system has per-
sisted in nature for at least hundreds of thousands of years
[28], leading Price et al. [27] to question whether ancient
drive systems might be evolutionarily distinct from younger
ones. Discovering the mechanisms underlying this drive
system would help clarify whether there are particular gen-
etic constraints that make the evolution of suppression less
likely, and if they are common to other ancient systems that
also have not evolved genetic suppression [27].
Thus, an understanding of the genetic architecture of
natural drive systems is important for understanding their
effects and how drivers evolved, but also can help inform
the design of synthetic drivers. Homing endonuclease drive
systems were described in yeast and bacteria, later inspiring
synthetic homing endonuclease drive systems [4,29]. The syn-
thetic Medea driver developed for the crop pest Drosophila
suzukii took inspiration from the natural drive system of the
same name [30], known from Tribolium flour beetles [31].
The development of synthetic X chromosome shredders in
mosquitoes [6] is preceded by the discovery in mosquitoes
of a natural X chromosome shredder [32], and the synthetic
sex ratio distorter being developed in house mice [17–19] is
directly based on the modification of the t haplotype [33].
Courret et al. [26] review the origins and mechanisms of the
19 known drivers in Drosophila, showing that nearly all of
the well-characterized systems evolve from gene duplications
and involve heterochromatin regulation, small RNA and/or
nuclear transport pathways. Uncovering how these systems
work is made difficult by their association with inversions,
heterochromatin and epistatic interactions [26].
Gene expression studies can help identify what elements
of drive systems do. In Lindholm et al. [34], the transcriptome
of the house mouse t haplotype is analysed. Carrying one
copy of the t haplotype primarily altered the expression in
testis of spermatogenesis genes, both of the genes mapping
to the t haplotype but also in a larger number of genes in
the rest of the genome. Whether these trans gene regulation
effects are achieved by transcription factors, non-coding
RNA, chromatin modification or other processes is currently
unknown. Other tissues showed fewer differences, and these
were mainly localized to the t haplotype. This study points to
a fine-scaled adaptation of the driver to the rest of the
genome or extensive co-adaptation between them. Can we
expect synthetic drivers to evolve to show similar patterns,
given enough generations?
(c) Implementation success and wider ethical
considerations of gene drive
There has been much discussion of the risks and benefits of
harnessing gene drives as a means to regulate and suppress
pest and vector populations in the wild—in particular,
malaria-transmitting mosquitoes [5,35]. Gene drives have
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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also been proposed as an effective and humane means to
regulate invasive species, for example, rodents on islands
[36] (see also Godwin et al. [15]; Manser et al. [17] in this
issue). The potential benefits are impressive: a reduced risk
of insect-transmitted disease and reduced reliance on pesti-
cides with all the associated detrimental side effects (such
as bioaccumulation in human food [37] or non-target wildlife
poisoning [38]). In addition, there are the increasing costs of
pesticide deployment owing to the inevitable emergence of
resistance and the continued risk of disease spread by resist-
ant vectors. There are also substantial risks associated with
the use of synthetic gene drives. One risk is the spilling
over of gene drives into non-target populations and species.
Despite the low likelihood of a gene drive transferring
between species, the United States (US) National Academy
of Sciences currently recommends that the risk of horizontal
gene transfer should be evaluated before any environmental
release of a gene drive is considered [8]. In addition to the
direct risks of gene drives affecting non-target species, it is
also important to assess the broader consequences that
removal or alteration of the target population or species
will have on the wider ecosystem.
The debate surrounding this technology stems in part
from insufficient knowledge about natural, let alone synthetic
gene drivers. The consensus seems to be that it is not cur-
rently possible to evaluate whether the benefits outweigh
the risks, but that this should not mean that research and
trials using gene drive should be banned. For example, the
recommendation by the Royal Society [39] to the United
Nations (UN) Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is
to avoid the adoption of any position that would support
an international moratorium on gene drive research, includ-
ing experimental field trials, a position which was echoed
at the UN CBD meeting in November last year [40]. The mor-
atorium was eventually rejected. The objection arose in part
because if research into gene drives was prohibited, the
knock-on effect would be detrimental because it would, in
effect, preclude any wider public debate before we have
determined the potential risk and therefore evaluated how
we might safely use this technology.
The moratorium was, however, reworded to emphasize
the need to consult with local communities and indigenous
groups that are potentially affected before a potential release
is considered, echoing the recommendations by George et al.
[21] and Ritchie & Stanton [10] in this issue. In general, any
potential future use of gene drives should be preceded by
public debate about the relative appeal of using gene drives
compared with alternative solutions. Much importance has
been placed on ensuring future research is appropriately gov-
erned to encompass a variety of broader societal impacts, in
addition to considering biosecurity and unwanted ecological
and health impacts [35]. Such a consultative approach is
stressed in the contribution by George et al. [21], who also
highlight the complexities surrounding the ethical consider-
ations of releasing engineered gene drivers in nature. The
importance of ensuring sufficient public and political confi-
dence is also emphasized by Ritchie & Staunton [10], who
argue that this is key to ensure wider uptake. The success
of this approach is exemplified by the work carried out by
Target Malaria (targetmalaria.org/who-we-are/), a not-for-
profit research consortium that aims to develop and share
technology for malaria control. The consortium includes
scientists, stakeholder engagement teams, risk assessment
specialists and regulatory experts from Africa, North America
and Europe, and includes an ethics advisory committee.
As yet, apart from making use of naturally occurring
endosymbionts, such as Wolbachia, to disrupt disease trans-
mission in mosquitoes, no synthetic gene drive has been
released into a wild population. The US Department of Agri-
culture has excluded genome-edited plants from regulatory
oversight, so this may change. The Australian government
also recently decided that they will not regulate the use of
gene-editing techniques that do not introduce new genetic
material into organisms but will increase their monitoring
requirements of gene drive experiments [41]. By contrast,
the European Union Court of Justice has ruled that
gene-edited crops should be treated as genetically modified
organisms subject to stringent regulation [42]. Clearly, there
is no global consensus.
The use of ‘biological’ control measures such as the endo-
symbiont Wolbachia that when introduced into A. aegypti
mosquitoes suppresses the transmission of dengue, Zika
and chikungunya viruses has already seen extensive field
trials in Australia and elsewhere [10,43]. The first successful
use of cytoplasmically induced male sterility to control
Culex mosquitoes was carried out in Burma more than
50 years ago [44], and several large pilot releases of wMel-
modified Aedes mosquitoes are currently underway (World
Mosquito Program: http://www.eliminatedengue.com/our-
research/wolbachia). Their successful deployment is reliant
on strong community and political support (e.g. the success-
ful World Mosquito Program aimed at eliminating dengue),
as without it they are likely to fail, as in the case of several
approved trials lacking support [10]. It is noteworthy that
the use of naturally occurring agents, such as Wolbachia
(that can cause effective sterilization by inducing cytoplasmic
incompatibility), appears to be less fraught with concerns
about their safety compared with synthetic gene drives.
However, Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes effectively drive
genes into populations and can, therefore, be viewed as ana-
logous to gene drives [45]. Is it possible that the more we
learn to harness these naturally occurring gene drivers, the
more our current apprehension about the use of synthetic
drivers will be lessened?
3. Concluding remarks and future directions
A number of general conclusions and promising avenues for
future research emerge from the individual contributions in
this issue. Below, we highlight some of the most significant
points.
We need to consider not just the technical but also the ethical and
societal aspects of synthetic gene drive. As Ritchie & Staunton
[10] and George et al. [21] argue, support from the commu-
nities affected by gene drive releases is critical to their
successful implementation. It is absolutely essential that
any future releases make major efforts to explain all relevant
aspects of the project and gain the support of local stake-
holders. The furore over genetically modified crops
illustrates how badly wrong a project can go if it does not
enjoy public confidence. The only way these potentially life-
saving gene drive technologies are going to be practically
useful is if they start off well, with successful projects that
gain substantial local support. An arrogant top-down
approach risks making gene drive technologies politically
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toxic, rendering them unusable for decades. This would
be potentially tragic for human health, agriculture and con-
servation. However, there are success stories [10], so this
consultative approach can work. Is it possible that there are
broad lessons to be learnt from the successful use of harnes-
sing natural systems such as Wolbachia to reduce disease
transmission in mosquitoes that can be implemented also
for deployment of synthetic drive?
Understanding the costs is key to predicting the dynamics of gene
drive. There have been great inroads made into quantifying
the potential costs of gene drive in natural systems as
reported in this Special Feature. However, fitness costs can
be hard to find: for example, the finding of Finnegan et al.
[22] of reduced viability associated with a meiotic drive in
stalk-eyed flies came after multiple previous studies of fitness
costs in the same species. In particular, we need to better
document the potential cost of drive in less well-character-
ized natural drive system involving non-model species
(i.e. other than flies and house mice). We also do not know
if these costs are modified over time as would be predicted
by a coevolutionary response. For example, the cost to
female Drosophila simulans flies of harbouring the Riverside
strain of Wolbachia has gone from an initial 15–20% fecundity
cost to a 10% fecundity advantage after only 20 years of coe-
volution [46]. Quantifying fitness costs of drive in both males
and females is vital to accurately predict the dynamics of
drive in natural populations (e.g. [23,24]). Subtle costs of
drive can also affect the success of synthetic drives. Beaghton
et al. [12] also investigate the transgenerational impact of
empirically demonstrated fitness costs, which has been a sur-
prising discovery in synthetic gene drive research. There is
clearly scope both to better refine existing predictive models
and to accumulate more data on potential fitness costs in syn-
thetic drive systems to improve our forecasting of synthetic
driver dynamics in natural populations.
Relative importance of balancing costs versus suppression for gene
drive success. Key to the success of implementing synthetic
gene drive for population control is their persistence for a suf-
ficient amount of time to achieve reduction (or elimination) of
the target population. Hence, delaying the likelihood and
speed of the evolution of suppression is an essential target.
However, the persistence of many natural gene drive systems
appears to be dependent on the strength of balancing selec-
tion [22–24,27] rather than on the evolution of suppression.
Currently, we do not know what features of a gene drive
system make it more or less likely to be shaped by balancing
selection as opposed to suppression. We also do not know if
there are any similarities between ancient gene drives in
which suppressors have not been found (e.g. sex ratio drive
in D. pseudoobscura, t haplotype in house mice and the long-
term persistence of Wolbachia-induced male killing in Drosophila
innubila [47]). In part, this lack of insight stems from the limited
knowledge about the gene(s) involved in the drive, as the mech-
anisms are not known for many systems [26]. However, just as
for sex ratio drive (e.g. D. simulans, [9,48]), there are examples of
male-killing systems displaying a dramatic flux of invasion, sup-
pression, replacement and resurgence of killing across
populations (e.g. Hypolimnas bolina butterflies [49]). Compari-
sons between these natural drive systems may reveal potential
features that are associated with the long-term persistence of
unsuppressed drive systems that could perhaps be incorporated
into the design of synthetic drivers. For example, are there
potential costly pleiotropic consequences of suppression that
are simply too great to overcome? On the other hand, it is poss-
ible that long-term persistence of unsuppressed systems is a
feature of a complex drive system involving multiple genes
and, hence, is unlikely to be translated in practice to synthetic
drivers, as they are simply too complex to construct. To date,
we do not even know if persistent gene drive is associated
with a few or many coevolving genes. We clearly need to
have a better understanding of the mechanisms of drive and
suppression of natural systems before these insights can be
translated into the design of synthetic drivers.
In addition, there are several unexplored opportunities of
gene drives.
(i) Many of the proposed uses of gene drives involve redu-
cing harm to humans from disease vectors, humanely
removing introduced animals to benefit conservation
or combating crop pests or weeds [11,15,35,36,50], all
of which could reduce deaths from disease and
reduce the use of pesticides and poisons. There are,
however, other potential uses [11], such as driving ben-
eficial alleles into populations to rapidly spread
adaptive variation. Driving adaptive variation could
hasten adaptation to potentially extinction-causing
threats, such as climate change, or protecting amphi-
bians from the chytrid fungus, which is already
implicated in the extinction of 90 species [51].
(ii) Major concerns about the use of gene drives are that they
will escape control, entering non-target populations,
jumping between species and having unintended nega-
tive consequences. However, it is possible that the safest
and most effective use of gene drives will instead be to
use them in coordination with existing control tech-
niques [11]. For example, to target a weed, a gene
drive that carries susceptibility to a herbicide might be
released in an agricultural area. This drive carries little
immediate cost, so may spread rapidly. The fitness cost
will only become apparent when herbicides are actually
deployed in the fields, and the controlled use limits these
costs to the target areas. Even if the gene drive spreads to
wild populations of theweed species, or related non-pest
species, the cost of well-designed herbicide susceptibility
is likely to be low except where herbicides are deployed.
One of the issues with gene drives designed to spread
rapidly and exterminate the target organism is monetar-
ization, as a drive that rapidly eradicates the target
species has not got a long-term income stream. Gene
drives developed as part of a holistic pest control plan,
where damage from the driver is dependent on the
deployment of a second factor, might be safe and con-
trollable, long-term financially successful and more
acceptable to the public.
(iii) The natural gene drives that have been discovered, and
the synthetic drivers that have been constructed, are
relatively direct in their action. They spread by convert-
ing genes, killing gametes that do not carry drive, shred
rival chromosomes and use other rather brute force
approaches. However, it is likely that many more
subtle possibilities for gene drive exist. In fact, many
of them may already exist in nature but have not yet
been discovered because researchers are not looking
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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for them or interpreting them as a drive. A fascinating
example occurs in fire ants (Solenopsis invicta). A gene
driver, the Gp-9 locus, within a large inversion, has be-
havioural effects on drive-carrying workers that result
in a transmission advantage for the locus—by selective
elimination of non-carrier queens and tolerance of mul-
tiple carrier queens within the colony [52,53]. It has
ecological consequences, as fire ants are invasive in
North America, and invasion success is associated
with an increased queen number [54]. There are likely
to be other non-reproductive gene drives, perhaps
driven by parental care biases, or siblicide, that have
yet to be discovered, or thought of.
Collectively, the contributions of this Special Feature
demonstrate the tremendous potential of gene drive systems
but also highlight several outstanding knowledge gaps. In par-
ticular, the wider ethical and societal implications of harnessing
and unleashing the power of selfish genes in natural popu-
lations are still only in the early stages of being addressed.
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